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MICKENS v. COMMONWEALTH
252 Va. 315, 478 S.E.2d 302 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
In March of 1992, the partially nude body of Timothy Jason Hall
was found in Newport News, Virginia. Physical evidence indicated that
he may have been sodomized, and that he had been stabbed 143 times.
Walter Mickens, Jr. was eventually arrested and charged with Hall's
murder. At trial, the most incriminating evidence consisted of DNA
evidence and statements Mickens had made to a cellmate while awaiting
trial.1
Mickens was convicted of capital murder in the commission of
attempted forcible sodomy.2 Based upon both "vileness" and "future
dangerousness," he was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.3 The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, granted Mickens's petition for a writ of certiorari and
remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia.4 The remand was ordered
in light of the Supreme Court's contemporaneous holding in Simmons v.
South Carolina5 that a capital defendant has the right to present evidence
that, if sentenced to life imprisonment, he will never be eligible for
parole. 6
In turn, the Supreme Court of Virginiaremanded the case to the trial
court for a new sentencing hearing at which Mickens would be allowed
to present his evidence of parole ineligibility.7 In February of 1996, the
trial court held a new sentencing hearing at which evidence of the crime
was limited to the testimony of two witnesses, a police technician and an
assistant medical examiner.8 In addition, the state established that
Mickens had been convicted of six prior felonies, including two separate
convictions for sodomy, and that he had been on parole at the time Hall
was murdered. Two victims of Mickens's prior offenses also testified. 9
In mitigation, Mickens called three witnesses. The first was a
correctional officer who testified that Mickens was cooperative and that
1 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 399-401, 442 S.E.2d
678, 681-82 (1994) (Mickens 1). For a more complete discussion of the
facts of this case, see case summary of Mickens, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 23 (1994).
21d. at 398,442 S.E.2d at 68 1. Specifically, Mickens was convicted
of violating Va. Code § 18.2-31(5).
3 Id. at 412, 442 S.E.2d at 689.
4 Mickens v. Virginia, 115 S.Ct. 307 (1994).
5 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
6 Id. at 168-69.
7 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423, 425, 457 S.E.2d 9, 10
(1995) (Mickens II). See also case summary of Mickens II, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 23 (1995).
8Mickensv. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315,317,478 S.E.2d 302,304
(1996) (Mickens III).
9 1d. at 318-19, 478 S.E.2d at 304-05.
10 Id. at 319, 478 S.E.2d at 305.
11 Id. at 317, 478 S.E.2d at 303.
121d. at 322, 478 S.E.2d at 306.
131d.
14 Id. at 322-23, 478 S.E.2d at 307.
15 The court rejected many of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusory language, often citing their previous rulings on the
issue in Mickens L Issues in this category which will not be addressed in
he had no "personal apprehension" of him. The second was a prison
counselor who found him receptive to counseling. Mickens's third
witness was his mother, who testified that Mickens had grown up without
a father figure and that he had begun to get into trouble in his early teens.
She pled for her son's life. 10
After considering the testimony, the jury again fixed punishment at
death, based upon both the "vileness" and the "future dangerousness"
aggravating factors.11
HOLDING
On direct appeal of Mickens's death sentence, the Supreme Court
of Virginia again affirmed, holding that (1) the trial court did not err in
refusing to remove a prospective juror for cause; 12 (2) the trial court did
not err in refusing to grant a bill of particulars; 13 and (3) the sentence was
neither imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor, nor disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases.
14
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment of most of
Mickens's assignments of error were cursory atbest,15 a few points about
the case deserve mention.
I. Evidence of Mitigation
Mickens, after pursuing his claim all the way to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and after succeeding in procuring a new sentencing
hearing, was able only to put on three ineffective witnesses in mitigation.
None of the witnesses could offer the jury an explanation as to why
this summary include: (1) the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, (2) Virginia fails to provide meaningful appellate review,
(3) defendant was entitled to additional peremptory jury strikes, and (4)
photographic evidence of the victim's body were admitted in error.
Additionally, Mickens unsuccesfully argued that Virginia's "vileness"
aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague. See case summary of
Mickens 1, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 23. Nonetheless,
defense counsel is to be commended for preserving these and the
"proportionality" issues for later federal appeal.
Mickens also argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a bill of particulars seeking the information upon which the
Commonwealth would rely at the new sentencing hearing. The Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected this argument, holding that there is no right to
a bill of particulars and that the discretion to grant or deny one rests with
the trial court. Mickens 111, 252 Va. at 322,478 S.E.2d at 306. The court
suggested that defense counsel should accept the Commonwealth's
assurances that "the evidence... [would] be substantially the same as the
evidence.., produced [in the first trial]." Id. at 322, 478 S.E.2d at 307.
The court declined to address the statutory basis of Mickens's request.
For an argument that Virginia law requires that a bill of particulars be
granted, at least whenever additional information is necessary to support
a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss the indictment on constitutional
grounds, see case summary of Goins, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9,
No. 1, p. 44 (1996).
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Mickens committed the crime of murder or why he deserved to live. The
court's opinion could not, of course, identify difficulties that may have
been encountered in presenting the case in mitigation. Nevertheless,
especially for a resentencing granted after a lengthy and well-fought
appeal, this mitigation evidence seems somewhat skimpy. Counsel who
desire assistance in putting together an effective case in mitigation, and
who contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, can be referred to
valuable resources in this field. It is especially important to develop, at
an early stage, a coherent theory as to why the guilty defendant deserves
to live.
II. "Weighing" in Virginia.
Mickens argued that "Virginia's death penalty statutes are uncon-
stitutional because they do not require a jury to find that aggravating
circumstances 'outweigh' mitigating circumstances."' 16 The Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected his claim in conclusory language, citing
Mickens I, which in turn cited Zant v. Stephens.17 In Zant, the Supreme
Court of the United States held Georgia's sentencing scheme constitu-
tional despite the fact that Georgia required no weighing of aggravating
and mitigating factors. 18 Like Georgia, Virginia is not a statutory
"weighing" state. Defense counsel in future cases should avoid using the
term "weighing" when fashioning arguments addressed to the many
legitimate constitutional flaws in Virginia's death penalty scheme. The
use of this term allows the Virginia courts an easy way to dismiss the
argument and avoid confronting the real issues. 19
16 Mickens III, 252 Va at 320, 478 S.E.2d at 305.
17 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
18 Id. at 880.
19 For a discussion of how to argue that the "future dangerousness"
aggravating factor (as well as the term "probability") is unconstitution-
ally vague, see Spencer, Challenging the Future DangerousnessAggra-
vating Factor, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 33 (1996).
20 117 S. Ct. 578 (1996) (per curiam).
21 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
III. Possible Implications of Greene v. Georgia
The Supreme Court of the United States recently held in Greene v.
Georgia20 that the Supreme Court of Georgia had incorrectly cited
Wainwright v. Witt21 as "controlling authority for a rule that [state]
appellate courts must defer to trial courts' findings concerning juror
bias."'22 As the Court was careful to point out, Wainwright v. Witt is
controlling authority for federal courts reviewing the decisions of state
trial courts, but is not a constitutional authority requiring state courts to
give deference to their own trial courts.
23
In Mickens III, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
refusing to remove a prospective juror for cause.24 The Supreme Court
of Virginia responded by holding that "[ain appellate court must give
deference to a trial court's decision whether to exclude or retain a
prospectivejuror because the trial court'sees and hears thejuror."'25 The
court then cited a state case, Eaton v. Commonwealth,2 6 which quoted
Witt. Thus, it is unclear whether the court meant that appellate courts
"must" give deference to the trial courts because of state law, or because
federal law, articulated in Witt, mandates it.27 If the court in Mickens
believed itself bound by federal law to give deference to the trial court
then it erred under Greene; if so, Mickens arguably would be entitled to
a new hearing to determine if he was denied a juror strike in violation of
state law.
Summary and Analysis by:
Daryl Rice
22 Greene, 117 S. Ct. at 579.
23 Id. at 578-79.
24 Mickens III, 252 Va. at 321, 478 S.E.2d at 306.
25 Id.
26240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
27 Virginia law on this issue reveals further ambiguity. For an in-
depth discussion of these cases and the ambiguity in Virginia case law,
see case summary of Greene, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
THE NEVER ENDING STORY: COMBATING PROCEDURAL
BARS IN CAPITAL CASES
BY: CAREY L. COOPER
I. Introduction
Although the subject of procedural bar has been treated numerous
times, the problem continues to create an obstacle to state and federal
appellate review. Recent developments have created new snares and
added nuances to old pitfalls. Particularly, the Supreme Court of Virginia
has continued to surprise defense counsel with novel default traps.
Over the past ten years, thirty-three capital defendants have been
executed in Virginia. All of these cases went before the Supreme Court
I The Virginia Court of Appeals tends to apply procedural rules
much more liberally in criminal cases than the Supreme Court of Virginia
does in capital cases. Although the rules are similar, the interpretations
and applications are divergent. For example, the Supreme Court of
Virginia interprets Rule 5:25 such that two objections may be required in
of Virginia on direct appeal. In those thiry-three cases, ninety-eight
claims were held to be procedurally barred.
The Supreme Court of Virginia implements its default and waiver
doctrine based upon a policy that elevates procedural regularity above
the merits of a claim. Too often, the end result is death by technicality.t
Whenever a procedural bar applies, the Supreme Court of Virginia will
refuse to hear the merits of the claim. Moreover, federal review of the
claim will almost certainly be cut off. Additionally, given that the
order to preserve claims based upon the improper granting or denial of
a challenge for cause. See Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268,427
S.E.2d 411 (1993). See also discussion, Part IV, infra. Although Rule
5A: 18 is analogous, the Virginia Court of Appeals has never imposed
such a requirement in other criminal cases. See Cudjoe v. Common-
